UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-28-2012

State v. Hansen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39061

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hansen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39061" (2012). Not Reported. 430.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/430

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

0

OPY

NO. 39061

)
)
vs.
)
ROBERT CASSIDY HANSEN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JASON M. GRAY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................6

L

II.

Ill.

Hansen Should Only Be Allowed to Appeal His
Sentence For Leaving The Scene Of An Injury
Accident Because The District Court Imposed
The Sentence Recommended In The Plea
Agreement On Hansen's Aggravated DUI Conviction ................ 6
A.

Introduction ......................................................................6

B.

Standard Of Review .........................................................?

C.

The Record Shows That Hansen Knowingly
And Voluntarily Waived His Right To Appeal
His Sentence For Aggravated DUl. .................................. 7

Hansen Has Failed To Establish That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The Victim's
Father To Make A Statement At The Sentencing Hearing ....... 10

A

Introduction .................................................................... 10

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 10

C.

Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion At Sentencing By
Allowing The Victim's Father To Make An
Informal Statement ........................................................ 10

Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District
Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion ................................... 13

A.

Introduction............................................................ ..... 13

B.

Standard Of Review...................................................... 13

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its
Sentencing Discretion .................................................... 14

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004) ........................................... 7
State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 38 P.3d 614 (2001) ..................................... 13, 14
State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 111, 831 P.2d 953 (Ct. App. 1992) ..................... 10, 12
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................... 11
State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) ................... 12
State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 129 P.3d 1241 (2006) ...................................... 7, 9
State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 997 P.2d 626 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................ 11
State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 943 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1997) ......................... 7
State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983) ................... 10, 12
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007) ..................................... 13
State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581,618 P.2d 759 (1980) ..................................... 11
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000) ....................................... 13
State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 851 P.2d 336 (1993) .................................... 11
State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,872 P.2d 719 (1994) ......................................... 7
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (2007) .......................................... 13
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P .3d 123 (2008) ......................................... 11
State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 593 P.2d 392 (1979) ..................................... 10, 12
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (2002) .......................................... 13
State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999) ....................................... 13
State v. Wickel, 126 Idaho 578, 887 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1994) ........................ 12

iii

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-2801 ....................................................................................................... 7

I. C. § 19-5306 .. .. .... .... . .. . .. .. .. ........................................................................ 10, 11

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert Cassidy Hansen appeals from his judgment of conviction for
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of an
injury accident.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Hansen was in the turning lane at an intersection when he turned into
oncoming traffic without yielding.

(PSI, p.2.)

As Hansen made the turn, he

struck and injured a motorcyclist, Donovan Jones. (PSI, p.2.) Hansen did not
stop but proceeded down the road at a "high rate of speed." (PSI, p.2.) Officers
located Hansen and "Hansen had an odor of alcohol coming from his person,
glassy eyes, slurred speech, and impaired balance."

(PSI, p.2.)

Hansen

admitted to drinking alcohol that evening and a blood draw showed Hansen's
blood alcohol content to be .217.

(PSI, pp.2-3.)

Hansen reported that he

consumed "four or five 4 Lokos in approximately four hours." (PSI, p.4.) Jones'
injuries included "a dislocated hip, possible hip and leg fractures, and several
large lacerations on his lower extremities." (PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Hansen with aggravated driving under the influence of
alcohol and leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp.61-62.) Pursuant to
a plea agreement, Hansen pied guilty to both charges. (R., pp.101-1 O; Tr., p.14,
Ls.1-4; p.15, Ls.8-11.)

The state agreed to recommend a sentence of three

years fixed with 12 years indeterminate on the aggravated DUI charge and zero
years fixed with five years indeterminate on the leaving the scene of an injury
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accident charge.

(R., p.111; Tr., p.10, Ls.5-8.)

The state also agreed to

recommend that "the sentences run concurrently and that the sentences be
served."

(R., p.111; Tr., p.10, Ls.8-10.)

The plea agreement contained the

following provision:
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to: (1) file a
Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal
any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all
suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the
State's sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set
forth above.
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).)

Hansen and his attorney both signed the

agreement and, in doing so, Hansen specifically acknowledged:"/ have read the
offer, I understand it, and I accept the offer on the above-stated terms." (R.,
p.111 (emphasis original).) At the entry of plea hearing, the district court asked
Hansen, "If the court follows the state's recommendation and orders a 3-to-15
year sentence or does something less, do you understand that you have waived
all right to appeal that determination or any other issue in this case?" (Tr., p.13,
Ls.10-15.) Hansen stated that he understood. (Tr., p.13, L.16.)
Prior to the sentencing hearing on those convictions, Hansen pied guilty to
the new charge of domestic violence and the district court consolidated the
matters for sentencing. (R., pp.242-51; Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12; p.29, Ls.6-11.) At
the sentencing hearing, the district court asked the parties, "Will there be any
individuals to address the court either formally or informally today or evidence to
present prior to argument?"

(Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.2.)

Hansen submitted

letters from the Victory Home and a friend, and two pastors made informal
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statements on his behalf.

(Tr., p.32, Ls.3-23; p.33, Ls.9-12.)

The state

presented informal statements from Hansen's wife, who was the victim in the
domestic violence case, Jones, the victim in this case, and Jones' father. (Tr.,
p.33, Ls.2-8, 13-18.) Hansen objected to the statement from Jones' father,
contending that Jones' father was not a "victim" in the case. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-10.)
The district court noted the objection, but allowed Jones' father to make a
statement. (Tr., p.36, Ls.20-22.) The state recommended five years fixed with
ten years indeterminate "in the aggravated DUI and the leaving the scene of the
accident" case.

1

(Tr., p.52, Ls.21-24.)

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of three years fixed with 12 years indeterminate on Hansen's
aggravated DUI conviction and a unified sentence of three years fixed with two
years indeterminate on Hansen's leaving the scene of an injury accident
conviction.

(R., p.145; Tr., p.66, Ls.8-13.)

The district court ordered the

sentences to run concurrent with each other. 2 (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, L.12.)
Thereafter, Hansen filed a Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.149-50.) The state
chose not to object to the motion

(R., p.160), although the plea agreement

prohibited Hansen from filing "a Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal

1

Under the terms of the plea agreement, the state was allowed to request
greater sentences than the state originally recommended in the plea agreement
due to Hansen's new domestic violence conviction and the drug charges that
were filed against Hansen prior to sentencing. (R., p.111.)
2
On the domestic violence conviction, the district court sentenced Hansen to a
five year indeterminate sentence that was ordered to run consecutive with the
other sentences. (R., pp.256-61; Tr., p.66, Ls.18-21.) Hansen is not challenging
his sentence for domestic violence on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p.2; Order
Granting Motion to Sever Consolidated Appeals and Dismiss Case No. 390622011.)
3

sentence)." (R., pp.111.) The district court denied Hansen's Rule 35 motion
without a hearing. (R., pp.158-61.) Hansen timely appealed. (R., pp.163-65.)
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ISSUES
Hansen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Is Mr. Hansen's appeal of his underlying sentence permitted
under the terms of the appellate waiver contained within his
plea agreement?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the father of the
adult victim of one of Mr. Hansen's underlying offenses to
provide a victim impact statement at sentencing over Mr.
Hansen's objection?

3.

Did the district court impose excessive sentences for Mr.
Hansen's underlying criminal convictions, and thereby abuse
the court's discretion?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should Hansen be allowed to appeal his sentence for leaving the scene of
an injury accident, but not his sentence for aggravated DUI, because he
only retained the right to appeal the sentence on which the district court
exceeded the determinate portion recommended by the state in the plea
agreement?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the victim's father to
make an informal statement at the sentencing hearing?

3.

Has Hansen failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Hansen Should Only Be Allowed to Appeal His Sentence For Leaving The Scene
Of An Injury Accident Because The District Court Imposed The Sentence
Recommended In The Plea Agreement On Hansen's Aggravated DUI Conviction

A.

Introduction
Hansen argues "that the district court's sentences of 15 years, with three

years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence and
five years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to leaving the scene of an
injury accident were excessive, and therefore constituted an abuse of the court's
discretion."

(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

However, under the appellate waiver,

Hansen may only "appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate
portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison terms' set
forth" in the plea agreement. (R., p.111.) The "Jail/Prison terms" section of the
plea agreement states that the state "will recommend a sentence of 3 years fixed
with 12 indeterminate for a total of 15 years on" the aggravated DUI charge. (R.,
p.111.)

The district court imposed the sentence recommended in the plea

agreement on that charge and, therefore Hansen cannot appeal that sentence.
(R., pp.111, 145; Tr., p.66, Ls.8-10.)
The only sentence Hansen can properly appeal under the terms of the
plea agreement is his sentence for leaving the scene of an i17jury accident
because the district court imposed a greater determinate portion on that charge
than the state recommended in the plea agreement. (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, 1113.) As such, Hansen's appeal from his sentence for aggravated DUI should be
dismissed.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract

law standards, and as a question of law, [the appellate court] exercises free
review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Where the waiver
of the right to appeal is entered as part of a plea agreement, the appellate court
"employ[s] the same analysis as [itJ would in determining the validity of any plea
of guilty." State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994)

C.

The Record Shows That Hansen Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived His
Right To Appeal His Sentence For Aggravated DUI
The right of a criminal defendant to appeal matters relating to his

conviction and/or sentence is a statutory right that may be waived. Cope, 142
Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457, 872 P.2d at 720
(citing I.C. § 19-2801 ). When the waiver of the right to appeal is included as a
term of a plea agreement, such waiver is enforceable as long as the record
shows that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Cope, 142 Idaho
at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457, 872 P.2d at 720; State v.
Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct App. 1997). 3
Hansen acknowledges that the district court imposed the sentence
recommended in the plea agreement on his aggravated DUI conviction.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Nonetheless, Hansen argues that he can appeal his
3

Hansen does not challenge the voluntariness of his plea agreement and the
record shows that Hansen's appellate waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made. (R., pp.104, 111; Tr., p.13, Ls.9-20.)
7

aggravated DUI sentence because the district court exceeded the determinate
portion recommended in the plea agreement on his leaving the scene of an
injury accident conviction.

(Appellant's brief, p.7.)

This argument is without

merit.
The plea agreement is unambiguous.

In exchange for Hansen's guilty

plea to "Count 1: Aggravated DUI" and "Count II: Leaving the Scene of an Injury
Accident," the state agreed to recommend a sentence of 15 years with three
years fixed on the aggravated DUI charge and a sentence of five years with zero
years fixed on the leaving the scene of an injury accident charge. (R., p.111.)
Hansen agreed as a term of the plea agreement to waive the right to:
appeal any issues in this case, including all matters involving the
plea or the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including
all suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the
State's sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set
forth above.
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).)

Hansen and his attorney both signed the

agreement and, in so doing, Hansen specifically acknowledged: "/ have read

the offer$ I understand it$ and I accept the offer on the above-stated terms."
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).)

The district court then imposed a sentence

identical to the recommendation set forth in the "Jail/Prison terms" section of the
plea agreement on the aggravated DUI conviction, but imposed a greater
determinate sentence than the state recommended in the plea agreement on the
leaving the scene of an injury accident conviction. (R., pp.111, 145; Tr., p.66,
Ls.8-13.)
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Pursuant to the plain language of the plea agreement, Hansen waived his
right to appeal "any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court," with the only exception being
that Hansen retained the right to "appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the
determinate portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison
terms' set forth" in the plea agreement. (R., p.111.) Accordingly, Hansen can
only appeal from the sentence that the district court exceeded the determinate
portion of the state's sentencing recommendation on, which is Hansen's
sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, Ls.813.)
Despite the appellate waiver, Hansen attempts to appeal from both
sentences even though the district court imposed the sentence recommended in
the plea agreement on his aggravated DUI conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp.7,
13-18.) However, Hansen is expressly prohibited from challenging his sentence
for aggravated DUI because the district court imposed the sentence that was
stipulated to in the plea agreement. Therefore, Hansen only retained the right to
appeal his sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident and his appeal
from his aggravated DUI sentence should be dismissed.

4

4

Because Hansen retained the right to appeal his sentence for leaving the scene
of an injury accident, it appears that he also retained the right to challenge the
district court's ruling on the admissibility of the statement made by the victim's
father at the sentencing hearing. See Cope, 142 Idaho at 499, 129 P.3d at 1248
(noting that "[rJetention of the right to appeal a sentence ... extends to underlying
information that forms the basis of the sentence.").
9

11.
Hansen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Allowing The Victim's Father To Make A Statement At The Sentencing Hearing
A.

Introduction
Hansen contends the district court erred by allowing the victim's father to

make a statement at the sentencing hearing because the victim's father does not
qualify as a "victim" under I.C. § 19-5306. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) However, I.C.
§ 19-5306 does not limit the types of information that the district court can

consider at sentencing as Hansen suggests. Hansen has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the informal
statement made by the victim's father at sentencing.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court presumes that the sentencing court is able to

ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. State v. Pierce,
100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 111, 831
P.2d 953 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct.
App. 1983).
C.

Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
At Sentencing By Allowing The Victim's Father To Make An Informal
Statement
Although I.C. § 19-5306 confers a right in victims to address the court, it is

not a limiting statute, and it does not create the only mechanism whereby the
court may accept evidence at sentencing. To the contrary, it is well settled that a
district court "has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to be admitted
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at a sentencing hearing." State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 625, 851 P.2d 336,
339 (1993) (quoting State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 618 P.2d 759, 761
(1980)). A defendant is denied due process when the sentencing court relies
upon information that is materially untrue or when the court makes materially
false assumptions of fact. State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P.2d 626,
633 (Ct. App. 2000). Even if the victim's father in this case did not have the right
to address the court under I.C. § 19-5306, Hansen has shown no violation of the
district court's discretion.
Hansen relies on State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008),
which was a capital punishment case, for the proposition that "the inflammatory
nature of the victim impact evidence received" should be considered in
determining whether "the district court's error in permitting improper victim impact
evidence to be introduced was harmless."

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.)

However, the harmless error standard set forth in Payne is inapplicable in this
case because Hansen has not established that the district court erred in allowing
the victim's father to make an informal statement at sentencing. Furthermore,
Hansen clearly failed to preserve the issue of whether the statement made by
the victim's father at sentencing was inflammatory because Hansen did not
object to the content of the statement.

5

State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3

P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a
proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is

5

Hansen only objected to the statement from Jones' father on the grounds that
Jones' father was not a "victim" in the case. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-10.)
11

preserved for appeal.").
In a non-capital case, where the sentencing decision is made by a judge
rather than a jury, the Idaho appellate courts presume that the sentencing court
is able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information
and material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. Pierce, 100
Idaho at 58, 593 P.2d at 393; Bundy, 122 Idaho at 113, 831 P.2d at 955;
Holmes, 104 Idaho at 314, 658 P.2d at 985. "A sentencing judge may properly
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to kind of
information considered or the source from which it may come." State v. Wickel,
126 Idaho 578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v.
Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Here, the district court exercised its discretion and allowed Hansen to
submit letters from the Victory Horne and allowed two pastors to make informal
statements on Hansen's behalf. (Tr., p.32, Ls.3-23; p.33, Ls.9-12.) The district
court allowed the state to present informal statements from Hansen's wife, who
was the victim in the domestic violence case, Jones, the victim in this case, and
Jones' father. (Tr., p.33, Ls.2-8, 13-18.) Hansen has failed to establish that the
district court abused the discretion it has to receive and consider a broad range
of information in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Because the district court
did not err in allowing the information presented at sentencing, it is unnecessary
to consider whether any of the statements made were inflammatory under the
harmless error standard. This Court should affirm Hansen's sentence.
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111.
Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hansen asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it

imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with three years fixed for aggravated DUI
and a unified sentence of five years with three years fixed for leaving the scene
of an injury accident.

(Appellant's brief, p.13.) As discussed above, Hansen

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence for aggravated
DUI.

Furthermore, even if the appellate waiver does not apply to Hansen's

sentence for aggravated DUI, Hansen has failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion in imposing either sentence.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the

defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)).
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C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
Hansen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

"sentences of 15 years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated
driving under the influence and five years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty
plea to leaving the scene of an injury accident" in light of his "rehabilitative
potential," his "troubled childhood," and his family support.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.13-18.)
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts.

Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable,

however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution. 19..:.
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the
objectives of sentencing, the seriousness of Hansen's offenses, his criminal
history, and his amenability to treatment. (See generally Tr., p.62, L.19 - p.67,
L.7.) The district court also considered the trauma Hansen has faced in his life
and his family support. (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-3, 11-13; p.64, Ls.12-13.)
Although Hansen is relatively young, he has an extensive criminal history
that includes juvenile convictions for incorrigible, runaway, truancy, battery,
burglary, minor in possession of alcohol, and escape.

(PSI, pp.4-6, 14-15.)

Hansen was committed to the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections in 2007
and placed in the Choices program. (PSI, p.15.) Hansen was released one year

14

later, but he continued to violate the law by committing the crimes of minor in
possession of alcohol and resisting and obstructing. (PSI, p.15.)
As an adult, Hansen was convicted of willful concealment and he received
four additional convictions for minor in possession of alcohol. (PSI, pp.6, 15.)
While the instant case was pending, Hansen pied guilty to domestic violence (R.,
pp.242-51; Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12), and he had charges pending for possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

(PSI, pp.6-7.)

Hansen has not performed "well on juvenile probation or adult misdemeanor
probation" in the past. (PSI, p.15.)
Hansen has been abusing drugs and alcohol since he was nine years old
and he is a former gang member. (PSI, pp.9, 12-13.) He has completed both
inpatient and outpatient treatment programs for his substance abuse issues,
however, he was only able to remain clean and sober "approximately three
months" after inpatient treatment and "a month or so" after outpatient treatment.
(PSI, p.13.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized that Hansen
has been struggling with "substance abuse and alcoholism" from a "very young
age," but noted that Hansen is a "young man who was given a myriad of options
and opportunities to rehabilitate and to turn it around, which, until recently it
appears, [Hansen] totally ignored or simply denied any effort to make a change
in [his] life." (Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.63, L.B.)
The district court also recognized that Hansen committed two very serious
offenses in this case. (Tr., p.64, Ls.2-10.) Hansen drove while intoxicated and
hit a motorcyclist at an intersection. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Instead of stopping, Hansen

15

chose to leave the scene of the accident "at a high rate of speed." (PSI, p.2.)
The victim's injuries were extensive and had a profound impact on the victim's
life. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.34, L.10 - p.36, L.3.) As stated by the district court, "this is
not a DUI.

This is an aggravated DUI and one that, frankly, was of a very

heinous injury and heinous conduct that led you to leave the scene and all the
rest that really makes this, from the court's prospective, one of aggravation .... "
(Tr., p.64, Ls.5-10.) The district court went on to state that "people cannot be
harmed to this degree and simply said, well, the response for that in the societal
perspective is just some months in jail, some rehabilitation, and hope in the
future that this time you really get it." (Tr., p.65, Ls.1-6.)
The district court appropriately determined that a period of incarceration
was necessary to protect the public and imposed reasonable sentences. The
sentences imposed were appropriate in light of the seriousness of Hansen's
offenses, the danger he poses to society, and his failure to rehabilitate in the
community.

Given any reasonable view of the facts, Hansen has failed to

establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Hansen's appeal
from his sentence for aggravated DUI and affirm Hansen's conviction and
sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident.
DATED this 28 th day of March 2012.

JA~
Deputy Attorney General
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